227
Arctic Yearbook 2013
Natural News, State Discourses & The Canadian Arctic
Throughout all of this time period, media discourses recreated a new and popularized account of the
North as an ‗icy treasure trove‘ where nations waited in the wings to stake claims to the Arctic
Ocean, in what had the potential to be a protracted and conflicted process – a new ‗Cold War‘ as the
media called it. The media reports generated by the flag-planting incident, which followed over the
next few years, attempted to explain the national context of the Arctic region in raw, geopolitical
terms. The break reflected more than just a Russian publicity stunt, however. It also referenced the
way in which discourses stressing state interest in Arctic waters and seabed resources were triggering
a call for state presence in the North in very different ways that had the cooperative environmental
agendas of the earlier Rovaniemi process of the 1980s.
Back to the (1970s) Future?
Since 2009, there have been signs of a shifting focus, or rather a realignment of sorts. In May of
2012, for example, the Canadian government announced that its fleet of armed vessels for Arctic
patrol would be delayed by at least three years: ―the Defence Department had been expecting to take
delivery of Canada‘s first of between six and eight Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships in 2015. But
documents tabled in the House of Commons on Tuesday show the timeline has been pushed back
to 2018‖ (Berthhiaume, 2012). While in the media today, the subtleties of maritime boundary
making, international law and border disputes has been debated from all angles, the rhetorically
aggressive response of the government has been duly noted and, until the very recent past, been
more often than not met with approval. Increasingly, however, the failure of the current Canadian
government to deliver a series of rather extravagant promises connected to the building of ships,
naval facilities, and general Northern security infrastructure, has been met by media disapproval.
This fit well with a general orientation of the Canadian public towards improving the military
security capability of the state. Polls suggest that the top foreign policy issue for Canadians has been
‗Arctic sovereignty‘. In a 2011 poll, for example, ―more than 40 per cent of Canadians [surveyed]
said the country should pursue a firm line in defending its sections of the North, compared to just
10 per cent of Americans (Mahoney, 2011).
Responding to Constructed Sovereignty Threats
The result of media reportage on climate change and sovereignty vulnerability, from both within and
outside of the Canadian press, has been mixed. There is a rather publically positioned outcry, both
for and against the seeming abandonment of the promise of a rapid deployment of ships and jets to
the North. For example, in the wake of a series of contradictory editorials published by two of
Canada‘s top Arctic scholars, one reporter lamented that:
Sovereignty, security, patriotism and pride are attractive and powerful concepts that have
played prominently in Prime Minister Stephen Harper‘s rhetoric surrounding the Arctic
since he was elected in 2006. His promises to bolster Canada‘s claims to the Northwest
Passage, the creation of Permanent Canadian Forces Ranger units to protect the nation‘s
North and the building of naval vessels capable of patrolling Arctic waters have
consistently been highlighted as aspects of his vision for a Canada First national defence
strategy.