Confidence- & Security-Building Measures in the Arctic: The Organization for Security & Co-operation in Europe as a Role Model for the Area?

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Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) had a major contribution to the lowering of military tensions and the reduction of false threat perceptions in Europe at the end of the Cold War. Embedded in the theoretical framework of the Bargaining Theory, this article claims to understand the role of CSBMs as an early structural tool of conflict prevention. Based on this theoretical understanding, this article focuses on practical implications and lessons learned from existing CSBM regimes in the OSCE framework and provides suggestions for a possible extension of these regimes to the Arctic Region. As the co-operation among all Arctic states is strong, this article further argues that the implementation of military information exchanges as well as measures of verification should not be seen as to counter any form of emerging military tensions, but rather as a means to further manifest the good bi- and multilateral relations in the area and in order to serve as a role model for other geographical regions and the discussion on future reforms of arms control.

Introduction

The exchange of military information, measures of their verification and additional forms of military co-operation form the core of military Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), which aim to prevent interstate conflicts by increasing openness and transparency in the field of military capabilities. Having their origin in the middle of the Cold War, a phase of military standoff between Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), CSBMs have made a major contribution to the lowering of military tensions and the reduction of false threat perceptions in Europe (e.g. Lachowski & Rotfeld, 2001: 323; IFSH, 2005: 5). At the end of the Cold War, four major international treaties and agreements containing CSBMs and other measures of Conventional

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Arms Control (CAC) emerged on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and within the framework of the Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (ibid.: 19 ff.). These treaties and arrangements are the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Vienna Document (VD),[1] the Treaty on Open Skies (OS) and the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI).

Early research in the field tried to evaluate the potential of these measures to sufficiently lower military tensions in East-West relations (e.g. Larrabee & Stobbe 1983; Ben-Horin et al. 1986; Borawski 1986; Berg & Rotfeld 1986) or analyzed them from a regime-theoretical perspective (e.g. Rittberger et al. 1990; Niemtzow 1996; Krupnick 1998; Schmidt 2004). In addition, several studies focused on new potential areas of application taking the measures of the OSCE as source of inspiration (Nathan 1994; Levite & Landau 1997; Self & Tatsumi 2000; Urgell 2005; Robinson 2010; IFSH 2011). The Arctic, and its constantly melting environment, has so far received little attention within this discussion.

One of the first comparable initiatives for the Arctic dates back to Mikhail Gorbachev's so called 'Murmansk Initiatives' in 1987 (Åtland 2008: 290 ff.). Besides the proposal of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ), these initiatives also included proposals on the reduction of the amount and size of major naval exercises, their mutual notification including the invitation of observers as well as the defining of "'No-go zones' for naval vessels and anti-submarine warfare (ASW)" (ibid.: 294 ff.). Even though the military sector of the Murmansk initiatives failed, tensions could be lowered by spill-over effects from successful cooperation in non-military areas (ibid.: 305 ff.).

Whilst the current security situation in the Arctic is still far away from any actual outbreak of armed conflict, authors like Kristian Åtland call in mind "that desecuritization is not an irreversible process" and that the emerging situation in the region may "jeopardize the achievements of Gorbachev's Murmansk initiative" (ibid.: 306). As a consequence, institutes like the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) likewise conclude that the increase of military forces in the area could be mitigated by the establishment of a respective CSBM regime (Wezeman 2012b: 13 ff.). Such a regime could possibly prevent the Arctic from becoming an area of military arbitrariness, and help to avoid misleading threat perceptions, as well as military driven tensions and accidents:

> "[...] you need to have proper rules of engagement, proper rules when you meet each other, because you are in a territory that both claim. Both can say: 'Well it is my right to point guns at you.' If you start doing that, you are asking for disaster" (Wezeman 2014).

Since by today the main military presence in the area is composed by Russian and US nuclear submarines as part of the countries' nuclear deterrence as well as their respective surface protection fleets (Wezeman 2012a: 8 ff.), the discussions on arms control in the Arctic mainly focused on a possible establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) (see e.g. Prawitz 2011).

Nevertheless, as average temperatures in the region are rising, conventional weapon systems will have an easier time operating in the area, an aspect which has so far remained scientifically and politically mainly unaddressed. In order to contribute to the closure of this gap, this article will primarily concentrate on a policy-orientated investigation of the

subject and also try to establish an understanding of CSBMs as a structural tool of conflict prevention based on their impact on James D. Fearon's 'Rationalist Explanations for War' (1995).

This article will thus not only provide suggestions for a possible CSBM regime in the Arctic Region, but also contribute to the theoretical discussion on conflict prevention. In order to achieve these goals, this article will first briefly summarize the current political situation in the Arctic, before presenting the theoretical background which forms the foundation of the argument why the implementation of CSBMs would have a positive effect on the manifestation of the existing strong co-operation in the area, before the article concludes with practical implications and proposals on the issue.

The Absence of Conflict? – The Arctic's Political Status Quo

With its still expected, nearly unexploited great fields of petroleum and gas, the Arctic, today, is considered to be one of the resource richest areas in the world (Bird et al. 2008: 1 ff.). This natural wealth has raised conflicting territorial claims by nearly all Arctic littoral states, but mainly Canada and the Russian Federation (UN DOALOS 2013) and a slowly but constantly increasing military presence in the area can be recorded (Wezeman 2012b: 1). As Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation stated:

> "Obviously military efforts safeguard economic ambitions. It would be strange for Russia, which has an enormous Arctic coastline, not to begin energetic, firm action for exploiting the region. [...] This is not an economic task, it's a geopolitical one. It's a question of national defence" (RIA Novosti 2013).

Besides the national interests of the eight Arctic states, the national energy security and economical interest of additional players such as China might hold an additional source of potential future conflict (e.g. Jakobson 2010; Xing & Bertelsen 2013). Regardless, currently, researchers and diplomats alike consider any form of military escalation in the Arctic to be very unlikely (Lind 2014; Bergh 2014; Wezeman 2014), an evaluation which is primarily based on three different aspects:

First of all, within the 2008 'Ilulissat Declaration' all five Arctic border states committed themselves to abide by international law in order to settle their conflicting territorial claims on the Arctic continental shelves (Arctic Ocean Conference 2008) and reiterated this commitment in 2013 in the context of the Arctic Council's 'Vision for the Arctic':

> "The further development of the Arctic region as a zone of peace and stability is at the heart of our efforts. We are confident that there is no problem that we cannot solve together through our cooperative relationships on the basis of existing international law and good will. We remain committed to the framework of the Law of the Sea, and to the peaceful resolution of disputes generally" (2013: 2).

Second, the recent military build-ups have been to date neither very strong in force projection nor specifically directed towards the Arctic. They are rather a logical response to a quickly melting environment, which for example requires a strengthening of the Arctic countries' northern border security infrastructure in order to counter potential threats

through for example smuggling or human trafficking (Wezeman 2012b; Lind 2014; Wezeman 2014; Bergh 2014). As Siemon Wezeman from SIPRI states:

> "There are of course in Russia a number of clear points into the direction of a stronger military presence in the Arctic, [...] most likely a number of extra patrol vessels, a number of extra bases along the northern axis of Russia, but nothing in the direction of 'we are going to set up there a major force' which is going to do exactly what? [...] Is it going to protect Russian claims on the Arctic by moving ice-strengthened patrol vessels around, which are not beefed up by any stronger military force, as they are incapable of operating in the Arctic with its too cold and too nasty weather conditions?" (Wezeman 2014)

Third, the strong co-operation among all Arctic states and in particular within the framework of the Arctic Council, such as in agreements on 'Search and Rescue' (SAR) or the detection of oil-spills (Lind 2014), lets a military escalation between the states currently appear very unlikely:

> "I think the Arctic Council has been a fantastic confidence-building measure, not by talking on military issues, but we sort of build this sense of community and bring together key decision-makers" (ibid.).

Taking this multilayered character of Arctic security – a balance between high stability and an increasing military presence – into account, the implementation of CSBMs in the Arctic seems currently neither very pressing nor very high up on the political agenda (ibid.). This consequently raises the question of why CSBMs in the Arctic should be implemented in the first place, a question which shall be answered in the subsequent sections of this article.

Theoretical Background: Confidence- and Security-Building Measures as a Tool of Structural Conflict Prevention

In order to better understand the positive conflict preventing effects of CSBMs if implemented in an area of strong ties and constructive multilateral co-operation, it is first of all important to define the concept of conflict prevention and to broaden the theoretical understanding of CSBMs as a form of structural preventive action.

Defining the Concept of Structural Conflict Prevention

Despite the prominent role of 'conflict prevention' in the policy sector as well as the considerable amount of research on the issue (Ackermann 2003: 340 f.), there is still little consensus on what the term 'conflict prevention' or the synonymously used terms of 'preventive diplomacy' and 'crisis prevention' actually imply (e.g. Wallensteen & Möller 2003; Lund 2007: 288). Also the scientific debate still lacks a clear and consistent theory of conflict prevention which mainly origins in disagreements on the time frame in which conflict prevention actually takes place and which instruments the concept should include (e.g. Wallensteen & Möller 2003; Lund 2007: 288). A concise overview over the different stages of peace and conflict is for example provided by Michael Lund:



Figure 1: Basic life-history of conflicts and the phases of engagement (Lund, 2007: 290).

The consequence is a large variety of different definitions (Wallensteen & Möller 2003: 4 f.) which is why Wallensteen and Möller propose to differentiate between 'direct' and 'structural' preventive actions (2003: 6). Whilst 'direct preventive actions' use a rather reactive strategy in which a crisis is already at the stage of a possible military escalation, 'structural preventive actions' focus on creating "such conditions that conflicts and disputes hardly arise or do not threaten to escalate into militarized action" (ibid.). This understanding of structural preventive actions shall also serve as the foundation of the main argument for the implementation of CSBMs in the Arctic region.

This article will therefore further follow the definition of Carment and Schnabel who see preventive actions as "a medium and long-term proactive strategy intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a stable and more predictable international security environment" (2003: 11).

In order to narrow down this still rather broad definition, this article further follows the proposal of Wallensteen and Möller by arguing that the 'dependent variable should rather be treated as a reduced likelihood of armed conflict than its actual full prevention (2003: 11). The 'independent variable' instead needs to focus on: "... an evaluation of how the typical factors that explain the onset of war can be offset by the preventive actions that the prevention literature discusses" (ibid.: 17). Thus any reduction of potential causes of armed conflict should also automatically lead to a reduction of the likelihood of its outbreak. This argumentation can be illustrated and summarised in the following general causal diagram:



Figure 2: Causal Diagram of Conflict Prevention.

In other words, in order to analyze and understand the conflict preventive effects of preventive actions, it is first of all necessary to identify the causal mechanism which links these actions to the reduction of a certain cause or even numerous causes of armed conflict. How this general approach of conflict prevention translates to the specific effects of CSBMs as a structural tool of conflict prevention shall be discussed in the subsequent section of this article.

Fearon's Rationalist Explanations for War

The issue of 'uncertainty', regarding other nation's military capabilities presents one of the root causes of armed conflict in the international system and is also subject to the bargaining theories of war, one of the most prominent in the field of peace and conflict research (e.g. Levy & Thompson 2010: 68; Mitzen & Schweller 2011: 12).

As many scholars in the field argue: war from a rational perspective is too risky and costly, which is why negotiated settlements should be the logical consequence for disputes in the international arena as they provide for the same outcome without both sides paying the high price of military escalation (e.g. Wittman 1979: 744 f.; Fearon 1995: 380; Gartzke 1999: 584; Reiter 2003: 28; Powell 2006: 169; Levy & Thompson 2010: 64). As James D. Fearon claims, war is considered to be a costly gamble, close to a coin flip situation and because most states in the international arena are seen as risk-neutral or risk-averse, there should always exist a number of possible negotiated outcomes – a bargaining range – which would leave both sides better off than the risk of actual fighting (1995: 386 f.). Fearon argues that under such conditions, only three fully rational explanations for the outbreak of interstate conflicts can be considered.

First, and probably most apparent, is the argument of 'indivisible issues at stake' which make it impossible to reach any agreeable bargain between two state parties (ibid.: 389). Fearon nevertheless refutes this argument by arguing that at least in theory, no issue which states usually argue about is indivisible per se, as there is also always the theoretical option of side payments (ibid.).

Second, states hold private information about their own capabilities and also have incentives to misrepresent them for strategic reasons. If combined, this can result in rational miscalculations which then, in a worst-case scenario, eventually lead to military escalation (ibid.: 390 f.). Due to such private information, states could for instance conclude to be militarily superior over their opponent, an issue which might increase their calculated probability to win or which could cause and underestimation of the opponent's willing-

ness to fight (ibid.: 390). Consequently, the higher the levels of private information, the less sure each side can be of the other's minimum threshold for war and the more dangerously and riskily is any attempt to increase one's own outcome within a bargaining situation.

Finally, Fearon argues that the outbreak of interstate armed conflict might be the result of possibly existing commitment problems in which states consider themselves unable to uphold a previously reached agreement (ibid.: 401). Due to the limited scope of this article as well as the focus on CSBM's military information exchanges and measures of verification, the impact of this aspect cannot sufficiently be addressed, but forms an interesting point of departure for further research.

As the aspect of indivisible issues at stake has been refuted, this article will consequently focus on the impact of CSBMs to reduce the amount of private information on military capabilities in interstate bargaining situations.

Defining the Concept of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

The OSCE's Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) defines CSBMs as

> "a comprehensive set of [...] information exchanges, means for compliance and verification, and different forms of military co-operation [which] aim to reduce the risk of conflicts, increase trust among the OSCE participating States, and contribute to greater openness and transparency in the field of military planning and military activities" (2011: 2).

Military CSBMs thus differ from non-military Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) as they are understood to focus on hard security issues of the first security dimension (OSCE - CPC 2012: 5) whilst CBMs rather address the "political, economic, environmental, social or cultural fields" (ibid.: 9) of mainly intrastate security (ibid.: 5):

	CSBMs	**CBMs**
Focus	Military	Non-Military
Addressed Security Dimensions	Politico-Military	Political, Economic, Environmental, Social, Cultural
Conflict Dimension	Interstate	Intrastate

Table 1: Differentiation between CSBMs and CBMs (based on OSCE - CPC 2012: 5 ff.).

While this article focuses on the reduction of private information on military capabilities, this constraint is not to neglect the "mutually reinforcing manner" (ibid.: 11) and possible spillover effects from an additional implementation of non-military CBMs, but rather a concession to the article's limited scope.

At this point it shall also be noted that CSBMs also differ from classical approaches of disarmament as they

> "do not seek to limit forces in terms of quantity or quality, but rather control and communicate how, when, where and why military activities are employed. They are intended to mitigate the possibility of conflict occurring through ac-

> cident, miscalculation, or failure of communication, and to diminish opportunities for political coercion and surprise attack" (Borawski 1986: 113).

CSBMs and the Reduction of the Levels of Private Information in Interstate Bargaining Situations

Based on the above presented definition of CSBMs, it is possible to identify and deduce the following three causal mechanisms through which they appear able to reduce the level of private information and thus also the likelihood of interstate armed conflict:

1. Exchange of military information;
2. Verification of compliance with agreed commitments;
3. Different forms of military co-operation.

This reduction of private information can already be considered to have a structural conflict preventing effect, as it increases the accuracy of the calculations of both sides' military capabilities: "In principle, both sides could gain by sharing information, which would yield a consensus military estimate [...] [and] doing so could not help but reveal bargains that both would prefer to a fight" (1995: 393). It can thus be assumed that the mechanism of 'military information exchange' forms the centrepiece for the conflict preventing effects of CSBMs.

Nevertheless, the sole exchange of military information itself appears not able to reduce the amount of private information sufficiently because rational acting states still remain with incentives to misrepresent their true military strength in their military information exchange for strategic reasons. While it is maybe not possible to exclude such situations completely from political reality, the key to their frequency lies in the possibility for other states to detect such non-compliance. If a state is caught cheating, the cheating state is sanctioned by the other side and the general level of trust in this state is strongly reduced. Consequently rational acting, risk-averse states which face a high quality of verification measures will avoid any of such situations. Therefore, the availability of measures of verification as well as their quality level appears to be the second crucial component of CSBMs as a structural tool of conflict prevention.

Thus, if combined, military information exchanges and measures of verification are able to credibly reduce the amount of private information in interstate bargaining situations as they increase the overall level of military transparency. Nevertheless, in order to unfold their full potential two additional preconditions need to be met.

First, the information exchange needs to include geographical information which actually allows the other side to verify the exchanged information, a claim which is also affirmed by the head of the Swedish team of Open Skies, Lieutenant Håkan Josefsson (2014). In a simplified model three such different locations can be imagined: the peacetime location of armed forces or military equipment, their area of deployment and their participation in military exercises or manoeuvres.

Second, the inspecting party must also have access to a respective measure of verification of which zone of application (ZoA) covers the geographic location reported within the information exchange.

If both conditions are fulfilled, the implementation of CSBMs can lead to a strong reduction of private information within their ZoA and can thus be seen as "a medium and long-term proactive strategy intended to identify and create the enabling conditions for a stable and more predictable international security environment" (Carment & Schnabel 2003: 11). The positive effects of additional measures of 'military co-operation' and especially the aspect of person-to-person contacts have been repeatedly stressed during the conduction of several qualitative in-depth interviews (Lind 2014; Josefsson 2014; Wezeman 2014; Bergh 2014). Such measures can be imagined to further contribute to a reduction of private information, through for example the invitation of observers to or even the conduction of joint major military exercises.

In sum, the conflict preventing nature of CSBMs can be summarized in the following causal diagram:



Figure 3: Causal diagram of CSBMs as a Tool of Structural Conflict Prevention.

From Theory to Practice: The Implementation of CSBMs as a Means to Manifest the Strong Arctic Co-operation

Based on this article's theoretical argumentation, it can be argued that the implementation of CSBMs in the Arctic Region would not only contribute to a manifestation, but even to a further strengthening of the already high levels of co-operation in the area, as a CSBM regime would:

1. Increase the overall levels of military transparency;
2. Establish a mutual understanding of all nation's military intentions;
3. Serve as a strong signal of all Arctic states to their also in the future full commitment to existing laws and agreements; and
4. Provide assurances about the fully defensive nature of the nation's increasing military presence in the region.

These positive effects are not to be undervalued even though the Arctic is currently characterized by a high level of co-operation and stability. Similar statements and evaluations which have until recently also characterized the political status quo on continental Europe, have now for example also undergone a drastic change as the result of the current crisis in Ukraine. Also the Arctic states need to acknowledge that the region remains still part of the broader context of global politics and has for example also already been a hotspot during the times of the Cold War (Lind 2014; Bergh 2014). As a consequence, the proposal of the implementation of CSBMs in the Arctic is not entirely new, but most of

the times practical ideas did not address all aspects of CSBMs or did not touch upon their practical implementation at all (Bergh & Oldberg 2011: 6; Wezeman 2012b: 14). It is thus important to broaden the general understanding of CSBMs and conflict resolution in particular, as both should not exclusively be seen as reactive tools to counter immediate threats to peace and security, but rather as proactive tools which create and further strengthen the structural conditions ensuring the peaceful settlement of disputes among nations.

Practical Implications and Proposals

As this article aims to contribute to the closure of this gap, the following section will present a selection of practical proposals which are based on the author's previous research on the issue and which have been worked out under the careful consideration of the current political status quo. The author would nevertheless like the reader at all time to bear in mind that some of these proposals might reflect a slightly idealistic point of view and solely reflect the author's personal perspectives on the subject.

Mechanisms and Zone of Application

When talking about practical implications and proposals for CSBMs in the Arctic, some researchers point to the importance of establishing proper rules of engagement and a higher level of people-to-people contacts in the area (Wezeman 2014; Bergh 2014).

In addition, the presented theoretical argumentation of this article also illustrates the positive conflict preventing effects of military information exchanges and measures of verification. These information exchanges should include location-specific information on the peacetime locations of troops and military equipment as well as on deployments and the conduction of military exercises and manoeuvres. These exercises and manoeuvres should be notified on lower notification thresholds than within the current version of the Vienna Document.

The zone of application for these information exchanges and measures of verification should furthermore be extended in order to include the currently existing CSBM regimes in the OSCE framework for uncovered Arctic regions in Northern Alaska, Northern Canada, Greenland and Russia:

Location-Specific Information		VD	OS Treaty	CFE Treaty
Arctic Region	*Peacetime Location*	ca. 2 %*	ca. 36 %	ca. 0,8 %**
	Deployments	ca. 66 %	ca. 36 %	ca. 0,8 %**
	Military Exercises/Manoeuvres	ca. 66 %	ca. 36 %	ca. 0,8 %**

* the sovereign territories of Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden within Europe

** only the Arctic land territories of Norway

Table 2: Coverage of the Arctic by existing CSBM regimes in the OSCE framework.

Included Categories of Military Equipment and Measures of Verification

Additionally, a potential CSBM regime in the Arctic should also aim to better cover the military branch of naval forces, especially since these forces already now, but even more so in the future, will play an even stronger role in the area (Lind 2014; Wezeman 2014; Bergh 2014) and are currently not sufficiently covered by existing regimes of CSBMs (Schmidt 2013: 16). In order to credibly reduce the amount of private information on naval forces, a possible CSBM regime in the Arctic should thus also aim to provide location-specific information for naval forces outside their peacetime location as long as they currently operate in the area.[2] Otherwise roughly 64% of the region consisting of international waters and Exclusive Economic Zones would remain uncovered by a possible future CSBM regime.

If such location-specific information on naval forces operating in the area would be provided, the treaty on Open Skies, in which state parties agree to accept (*passive quota*) and are able to carry out (*active quota*) aerial observation flights over the sovereign territories of all other state parties (OS 2002: 5), would probably appear as the first choice of their verification (Spitzer 2009: 11; Josefsson 2014). While currently not able to credibly verify naval forces on the high seas, a prior briefing of the observed party on the current naval presence and activities in the area, as well as the further designation of respective OS airfields in the countries' northern territories would make the treaty on OS appear a strong potential tool of verification (Josefsson 2014).

While Open Skies already covers the land territories of all Arctic states, but is not able to verify detailed information on state's military equipment (ibid.), a possibility of on-site inspections following the general concept of the Vienna Document would most likely further contribute to an increased level of transparency and trust in all states' defensive presence of military forces. While in general of a more thorough nature, inspections as carried out under the legally binding treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe appear to be too overdrawn considering the current level of cooperation in the Arctic.

When it comes to the question of which categories of military equipment should be included in the exchange of military information, countries should not only take into account currently used and deployed equipment in the area. Instead, their decision should already consider today that the melting environment and the associated increase in the general temperature levels, might open up the Arctic for more different categories of conventional weapon systems, even though they are by today not able to operate in the area (Lind 2014; Wezeman 2014).

Figure 4: A Russian nuclear submarine vessel in its home port (RIA Novosti. Vittaly Ankov).

A final thought shall be dedicated to the inclusion of submarine vessels. While already forming one of the major present forces in the Arctic nowadays (Lind 2014; Wezeman 2014; Bergh 2014), information exchanges and especially measures of verification outside their peacetime locations appear extremely difficult and of highly sensitive military nature. This holds especially true as submarines form a major component of some Arctic states' nuclear deterrence (Lind 2014; Wezeman 2014; Bergh 2014). While submarine vessels if submerged are not detectable through aerial observation and hence countries invest large amounts of resources in techniques which ensure that they remain undetected, it appears least likely that they would agree to any form of verification which suddenly makes these vessels detectable. A workaround for this problem could nevertheless lie in the division of the Arctic seas into larger sectors, for which the entrance and departure of submarine vessels should be made notifiable. Such sectors of course need to be defined large enough so that the primary defence of submarines, meaning their ability to operate undetected, is not too severely restrained. For the purpose of verification, submarines could for example let ascend smaller signal-transmitting surface markers which indicate their entrance or departure into a certain sector and which could then afterwards be verified through for example aerial observation flights. If needed for reasons of protection, such surface markers could also transmit their signals delayed, in order to further ensure that their precise detection of submarine vessels is not possible. Apart from the purpose of verification, such notifications of the entrance and departure of submarines into certain areas of the Arctic could also enhance their operating security and support potential SAR missions in case of emergencies.

Cost Efficiency and Role of the Arctic States

While maybe not fully convinced of the positive effects and necessity of CSBMs in the area, most of the Arctic states are probably also concerned about too strong of an influence by outside actors (Bergh & Oldberg 2011: 6 f.; Lind 2014; Bergh 2014). This concern can be met as it would be possible to implement a solely regional interstate agreement between all Arctic states as it has for example already been the case for the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea region or South Eastern Europe (Lachowski & Rotfeld 2001: 321) and as it is also strongly encouraged by the current version of the Vienna Document:

> "The participating States are encouraged to undertake, including on the basis of separate agreements, in a bilateral, multilateral or regional context, measures to increase transparency and confidence. Taking into account the regional dimension of security, participating States, on a voluntary basis, may therefore complement OSCE-wide confidence- and security-building measures through additional politically or legally binding measures, tailored to specific regional needs. On a voluntary basis, numerous measures provided for in the Vienna Document, in particular, could be adapted and applied in a regional context. Participating States may also negotiate additional regional CSBMs, in accordance with the principles [of the OSCE]" (VD'11 2011: 44).

Since the mandate of the Arctic Council explicitly excludes issues of military defence (The Ottawa Declaration 1996: 2), any form of discussion or negotiation would probably best take place within the regularly meetings of the Arctic chiefs of defence staff (Lind 2014; Bergh 2014).

Furthermore, most of the above mentioned and proposed steps could be implemented without any larger additional investments by the Arctic states, as they could simply make use of existing structures and regimes. This could for example be achieved by extending their mandates and by increasing their zones of application, which would furthermore increase the degree of capacity utilisation of the nation's verification departments. In order to even further reduce costs, information exchanges and verifications in the Arctic region could be carried out in close cooperation such as through combined verification teams and institutions as it has already been proposed for future reforms of arms control in the European context (Schmidt 2013: 23 f.). In this regard, a potential CSBM regime in the Arctic could not only be designed in a more cost efficient manner, but the region could furthermore also serve as a role model for other areas or future reforms within the OSCE framework. The good co-operation among all Arctic states would in this aspect only further support such a forward-looking layout of arms control.

The proposed systems of information exchange and verification could moreover also be used as complementing tools for SAR missions, maritime law enforcement, and border control as well as for the possible detection and observation of oil-spills and other environmental disasters. Such cooperation for example already exists in form of the Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) (2014) or has been proposed for the extended use of the mandate of the treaty on Open Skies (Spitzer 2009: 10).

Summary

Summing up the practical proposals of this article, a possible future CSBM regime in the Arctic should include location-specific military information exchanges and measures of verification on military equipment, armed forces, and military exercises. Furthermore it should provide information on military policies and doctrines as well as preferably also incorporate additional measures of cooperation as well as commonly shared rules of engagement (Wezeman 2014). With regards to the zone of application, CSBMs should not be solely limited to the sovereign territories of the Arctic states, but also include the Arctic international waters. The more of these aspects are met by a potential future CSBM regime, the more it would be able to increase and manifest an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual trust.

Concluding Remarks

In the light of major budget cuts and modern equipment, the strong role of conventional arms control is often seen as a relic from the times of the Cold War (Schmidt 2013: 4 ff.). Letting its role further diminish would be a severe mistake, due to its important contribution to create structural conditions for the prevention of interstate armed conflicts (ibid.: 6). The recent crisis in Ukraine in which measures of CSBMs have been used intensively in order to diminish the escalatory developments (OSCE, 2014), seem to confirm the strong and important role of existing regimes of conventional arms control and CSBMs and let them appear more important than ever. The Arctic region, as an area of generally good co-operation and trust among its states, could for this purpose serve as a role model and lead the discussion on the future of arms control into a new time period.

Such discussions on CSBMs in the Arctic are better started earlier than too late, as the sufficient build-up of trust between states is a time-consuming process and is easier and faster seriously harmed, as again the current crisis in Ukraine and the strong decline in NATO-Russian relations illustrate. Thus it might be best to use the currently fruitful co-operation in the region and to start a respective dialogue on the topic early in order to be well prepared for any potential future developments and to establish the structural "conditions that conflicts and disputes hardly arise or do not threaten to escalate into militarized action" (Wallensteen & Möller 2003: 6).

It should nevertheless not be neglected that while CSBMs appear to have a positive contribution to the structural prevention of interstate armed conflicts, they are not necessarily able to fully prevent the outbreak of interstate armed conflict by themselves:

> "Arms control is only a small part of conflict prevention. It takes away some of the means, but it does not take away the will. You may have cases where you have arms control, you have much reduced numbers of weapons, but still the conflict will break out, because the will is there or the unwill to prevent it" (Wezeman, 2014).

Consequently, CSBMs and also their measures of verification (Ifft et al. 2012: 16) should within the concept of conventional arms control be understood as one strategy within a broader set of different mechanisms. These mechanisms range from for example limitations of major weapon systems to the establishment of demilitarised zones (Wezeman 2014). Furthermore CSBMs should also be treated as part of a broader package of policies as for example the different security dimensions of the OSCE indicate (IFSH 2005: 17 ff.).

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Notes

1. In the further course, this article will also make use of the abbreviation 'VD'11' in order to refer to the most recent version of the Vienna Document adopted in November 2011 (VD'11 2011).
2. Similar provisions on the ZoA have for example also been made in the in 2002 adopted 'Document on confidence- and security-building measures in the naval field in the Black Sea' (2002: 8).

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List of Acronyms

ASW	**A**nti-**S**ubmarine **W**arfare
CAC	**C**onventional **A**rms **C**ontrol
CBMs	**C**onfidence-**B**uilding **M**easures
CFE Treaty	Treaty on **C**onventional Armed **F**orces in **E**urope
CPC	**C**onflict **P**revention **C**entre
CSBMs	**C**onfidence- and **S**ecurity-**B**uilding **M**easures
FSC	**F**orum for **S**ecurity **C**o-operation
GEMI	**G**lobal **E**xchange of **M**ilitary **I**nformation
IFSH	**I**nstitut für **F**riedensforschung und **S**icherheitspolitik an der Universität **H**amburg
JCG	**J**oint **C**onsultative **G**roup
NATO	**N**orth **A**tlantic **T**reaty **O**rganization
NWFZ	**N**uclear-**W**eapon-**F**ree **Z**one
OS	Treaty on **O**pen **S**kies
OSCC	**O**pen **S**kies **C**onsultative **C**ommission
OSCE	**O**rganization on **S**ecurity and **C**o-operation in **E**urope
SAR	**S**earch **a**nd **R**escue
SIPRI	**S**tockholm **I**nternational **P**eace **R**esearch **I**nstitute
SUCBAS	**S**ea **Su**rveillance **C**ooperation **Ba**ltic **S**ea
UN DOALOS	**U**nited **N**ations **D**ivision for **O**cean **A**ffairs and the **L**aw **o**f the **S**ea
VD or VD'11	**V**ienna **D**ocument
ZoA	**Z**one **o**f **A**pplication