

Human security – An alien concept for the Russian Arctic?

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The discovery of oil and gas deposits in the Arctic placed the Arctic region high on the national agenda in Russia. As a result, in official documents and political statements, the Russian Arctic is mainly framed in terms of national, economic and military security as the Arctic is positioned as a strategic source for national development. A connection between security and development remains unproblematised in the main discourse. The Russian economy in general depends on incomes from petroleum revenues. Some of Russian regions prosper due to oil and gas extraction sites located on their territory. At the same time, the Russian Arctic for decades has been a place with difficult socio-economic situations due to an incoherent state policy towards the region. This brings a lot of insecurities and instabilities in daily life for people living in the Russian Arctic. Nonetheless, these insecurities are not visible in the official narrative of security and development. Therefore, this article will demonstrate how security and development are interconnected. Another question it will address is whether human security has a place in the Russian security landscape at all? These questions will be answered in several steps. First, I discuss connections articulated in the literature on development and security. With the help of a framing approach, I explore how the Russian state approaches development and security in the Arctic. Third, using the case of the Murmansk region, I expose a regional understanding of development and security. In the end, I will compare and discuss regional and national perspectives.

Introduction

As temperatures increase and the ice retreats, extractive industries have the possibility to enter new and previously unavailable Arctic areas. Issues of power, security, international regimes and cooperation have become topical. Russian Arctic policies have acquired a special interest since Russia is geographically the largest Arctic state and has the longest coastline. At the same time, Russia remains “the least known Arctic player, but the most determined” (Laruelle, 2013: xx). Russian Arctic policies are subjects of discussions and can be characterized as complex and contradictory (see, for example, Wilson Rowe, 2009; Laruelle, 2013; Foxal, 2014; Klimenko, 2016; Baev, 2018). By analysing Russian Arctic policy transformation between the 1990s and 2000s, Laruelle (2013) concludes that Russia has sent mixed messages to the international

community in relation to the Arctic and its policies. But what kind of messages do the Russian Arctic regions get?

There are ongoing discussions related to drivers underlying Russian Arctic policy. Two factors can be selected as affecting both Arctic policy and security in Russia. First, Arctic policy can be characterized as centralized (Laruelle, 2013). The Russian governance structure presupposes strict subordination of regional and local authorities to the federal one. It brings uncertainty to the regions since issues of regional development, Indigenous peoples, and social concerns “are not ignored, but instead must find a place within the grand design constructed by the Kremlin” (Laruelle, 2013: 6). The regions cannot decide upon oil and gas revenues since all offshore fields are defined as being of federal significance (Moe & Wilson Rowe, 2009). Security architecture is also very centralized with the President on top with other subordinate structures such as the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the government, federal authorities, authorities of the entities of the Russian Federation and local governments below the President. This architecture is the result of developments in Russian security policy between 1992 and 2010. As it has been discussed elsewhere (see Goes, 2017), a transformation in security construction – from the triad of equal partners “individual, society and state” in 1992 to the “state only” perspective of 2010 - took place. Second, several Arctic policies coexist, they are often poorly coordinated and depend on interests of particular groups or persons (Wilson Rowe, 2009; Laruelle, 2013; Baev, 2018). As Baev (2018: 411) summarizes: “Russia’s interests in the Arctic are far from coherent or even complementary, and the lobby groups that pursue them - from the Northern Fleet command to oil companies and the Russian Geographical Society - are often at odds with one another, making the Kremlin the ultimate arbiter.” In this situation regions are struggling to articulate their needs and concerns on the federal level (Goes, 2017). The existence of several policies is also detected by researchers discussing Russian strategy in the Arctic, where two contradictory approaches are implemented simultaneously: “security first” and “cooperation first” (Laruelle, 2013; Foxal, 2014; Hønneland, 2016; Heininen, 2016). The existence of two approaches is confusing and it is not always obvious what Russia wants in relation to international cooperation and regional development. At the same time Russian Arctic policies are underpinned by several interests, which according to Baev (2018), can be collected into four main groups: nuclear/strategic, geopolitical, economic/energy-related, and symbolic. This division is nominal since the interests “interact in many disharmonious combinations” (Baev, 2018: 410). In relation to these interests, several crisscrossing security issues are in focus: military, energy, economic and environmental. Military capabilities are probably the most discussed issue of Russian Arctic policies (see Baev, 2009; Konyshchev & Sergunin, 2014; Klimenko, 2016). Economic/energy security is discussed by Godzimirski (2014), Mitrova (2014), and Khrushcheva (2016). Environmental security is discussed by Pursiainen (2005), Foxal (2014), and Hønneland (2016). While several security issues are discussed, the focus is still placed on the state and inter-state relations rather than on other security actors. The issue of geopolitics remains dominating while other security approaches like, for example, human security, are less explored. In addition, Hønneland (2016: 16) points out that in general the literature on the politics in the Arctic has been empirically oriented for several decades and therefore less attention is given to development of analytical approaches and theoretical frameworks.

This article addresses some gaps discussed above and has two research questions in focus. The first question is how security and development are interconnected in general and what kind of

meaning these concepts have in the context of the Russian Arctic. Another question is whether human security has a place in the Russian Arctic security landscape at all? Findings of this article contribute to the field of development studies as well as critical security studies. In both fields there is a demand for contextualization (regional, historical, political, institutional) of the concept (Currie-Alder et al, 2014; Hossain et al, 2016). This examination will help to clarify the meaning of the concept of development in the Russian Arctic in order to reveal the gaps between goals of public policy and achievements in practice. When it comes to the concept of human security, in comparison with a number of writings on the Russian Arctic in general, the number of publications on Arctic security, and human security in particular, is relatively small. I use sources published in both English and Russian in order to create a broader picture and introduce materials unknown to both sides. First, I will discuss connections articulated in the literature on development and security in order to create some analytical perspective. Then with the help of a framing approach I will explore how development and security are interpreted in the official federal documents on the Arctic in order to reveal how the Russian state approaches these two concepts. Third, I will explore a regional understanding of development in security. In the end, I will compare and discuss regional and national perspectives. This will contribute to a better understanding of the peculiarities of governance in Russia and ongoing processes related to security and development.

Selecting the case of the Murmansk region: security and development

My interest in to the connection between security and development was generated by work on my PhD thesis within the framework of a research project focused on security in the Arctic (for more on the project see Hoogensen Gjørsv et al, 2016). By 2007 the Arctic had become a territory of great research and political attention both in terms of economic, security and environment interests of nation-states as well as in terms of geopolitical issues. The country of my particular interest was Russia as the largest Arctic state which in the 1990s “disappeared from the Arctic security landscape” due to economic and political challenges and re-emerged in the 2000s in “all Arctic debates” (Laruelle, 2013: xxi). What is more interesting, on the national level, within a decade (between 1997 and 2008)¹, the Russian Arctic was transformed from a subsidized client to the source of the social and economic development of the country, and became essential for national security in Russia.

The challenge was how to talk about security in a country where people were not used to talking about it, since the security sphere is “something in which ordinary citizens should not meddle” (Medvedev, 1998: 80, cited in Aatland, 2009: 8). Being Russian myself, I was aware of the general attitude to this word. It happened historically that the term “security” became connected to the term “state security”, which first appeared in 1934 with the creation of a special department for state security within the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). The NKVD existed in 1934-1946 and was responsible for maintaining public order and combating crime. This organization became known as an example of the state structure violating the law and abusing its power of political control. The term “state security” came into use in Soviet legal literature in 1936 when a new constitution (known as “Stalin’s constitution”) replaced the first Soviet constitution from 1924. Though the term “security” was used without any particular clarification (Constitution 1936, chapter 2, section 14, paragraph 1), its origin in the NKVD and “Stalin’s constitution” played a significant role in the term’s further application. Due to defence

preparedness in light of the Cold War, the term was so highly militarized and securitized during the next several decades, it became difficult to talk about security in everyday life. The term “security” became equated with “state security” and, in turn, “state security” became almost synonymous with the term “military security” in the Russian context (Sergunin, 2012). This semantic confusion was inherited by contemporary Russia. It resulted in a situation where it is difficult to demarcate the line between different security issues (Sergunin, 2012). My first round of phone calls to potential interviewees in Russia confirmed my concerns: the word “security” was frightening people – and they were trying to find excuses why they could not discuss this topic.

The Murmansk region in the years 2007-2012 was an interesting case. It borders on Norway and Finland and is viewed by the Russian state as a geo-strategically important area because of the ice-free sea. A large nuclear fleet is located in the ports of the Murmansk region, including icebreakers and submarines. At the same time, the Murmansk region hosts one of the biggest gas deposits – the Shtokman gas and condensate field (Government of Murmansk, n.d.), which is located on the shelf of the Barents Sea, approximately 550km away from the shore. Therefore, the Murmansk region was a territory where new trends – oil and gas development in the Russian Arctic shelf – meet traditional military-strategic requirements. But how do these trends affect the region? What do these changes mean for people?

Prior to my fieldwork in 2008-2009 in the Murmansk region, I was reviewing the literature on human security and I questioned whether human security was at all applicable in the Russian context. There is no adequate translation of “human security” into the Russian language, though there have been attempts to translate the term “human security” and to extract the main thoughts from existing literature in English (see, for example, Noyanzina, 2010; Borisov, 2011; Bokeriya, 2017). The human security agenda was launched in 1994 as part of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with the aim of focusing on people and their lives, not just on states. The Human Development Report (HDR, 1994: 24-25) outlined the necessity for protection from a variety of threats to human safety and welfare including economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security issues. It did not provide readers with a clear definition of human security, but stressed that people should be able to exercise their choices freely and safely (HDR, 1994: 23). A nexus between “human security - human development - human rights” as articulated in the HDR (1994) is defined by some researchers as a weak point: the concept of human security loses its anchoring and becomes everything and nothing (Chandler, 2008). In my case, this weak point became a strength. If human security can provide “a more comprehensive emphasis on human development, human rights and the role of non-state actors” (Hudson, 2005: 165), why cannot these other concepts, in turn, provide more information about human security? I decided to use the word “development” as an entrance to my interviews. By the time I was doing my fieldwork in the Murmansk region there were a lot of discussions in terms of “development”. These discussions were related to debates around the Shtokman gas field: how to develop it and what development would bring to the region. I decided that the word “development” would be familiar to my interviewees and could be a safe starting point for our conversations. The word “development” helped to create a sort of comfortable atmosphere for interviewees, which allowed us to move smoothly to the field of security – initially perceived by the majority of interviewees as dangerous or unwanted. Thus, my fieldwork revealed connections between security and development, but

these connections should be better examined in order to answer a question: what does it mean for the Russian Arctic in general and for the Murmansk region in particular?

Oil and gas of the Russian Arctic

In 2000, the U.S. Geological Survey presented an assessment of worldwide undiscovered oil and gas resources (Glomsrød & Aslaksen, 2006). Though the survey had limited data and didn't include estimates of undiscovered resources from all basin areas north of the Arctic Circle, the results of it strongly affected various communities – scientific, political, business and the general public. The cause was the statement that “25% of undiscovered petroleum resources” were located in the Arctic (Bailey, 2007). By 2002, Arctic Russia was estimated to have 45 - 55% of the total volume of the undiscovered oil and gas resources in the Arctic (Glomsrød & Aslaksen, 2006: 29). An assessment from 2008 showed that more than 70% of promising or undiscovered deposits of natural gas were located in three provinces: the West Siberian Basin, the East Barents Basin, and Arctic Alaska. It was also estimated that approximately 84% of undiscovered oil and gas was to be found offshore (CARA, 2008). The interest in the Arctic was growing. This was despite Arctic energy resources being characterized as “undiscovered” and “unproven” (Arctic Council SDWG, 2007: 7).

In 2001, Russia made a submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to establish a new border of the continental shelf and claimed that the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges were an extension of the Eurasian continent, allowing Russia to extend its Arctic maritime jurisdiction. In 2002 The CLCS replied that Russia had to submit additional scientific evidence. Among the tasks of the polar expedition *Arktika-2007*, which consisted of several stages, was to find justifications for this territorial claim. The expedition proved that the Lomonosov Ridge was linked to Russian territory and claimed that, potentially, the territory contained 10 billion tonnes of gas and oil deposits (Harding, 2007). The expedition received extensive media coverage both in Russia and abroad. Three members of the expedition were awarded the highest honorary title in Russia – “Hero of the Russian Federation”. One member was awarded the order, “For the merit of the fatherland” (third class). These awards demonstrated the significance of the expedition and its discoveries for the Russian state. In September 2008, the Basics of the State Policy in the Arctic (BRFA-2020) were adopted.

Heininen (2016) points out that the increasing role of energy security is a global trend. Moreover, energy security becomes increasingly important in oil and gas dependent countries like Norway, USA or Russia, since access to energy resources is related to power and geopolitical influence (Heininen, 2016: 19, 22). The first economic crisis of the years 1992-1995 in Russia demonstrated the power of economic security. The threat of economic insecurity forced the state to search for new sources of economic sustainability. The oil and gas sector was one of the few sectors of the Russian economy which was slightly affected during the first crisis and demonstrated a fast recovery when compared to other Russian industries like machine building or metallurgy (Zubarevich, 2016). The price for oil and gas was relatively stable in the 1990s and the export of petroleum provided a stable income, in particular for regions where the oil and gas was produced. That is why it is not surprising that the oil and gas sector became viewed by the state as a cure for economic insecurity. Kryukov (2009) points out that the decision to develop the Russian Arctic shelf was mainly based on the reason of economic security rather than energy. The Shtokman project was initiated to support the military-industrial complex of the Murmansk

and Arkhangelsk regions in a critical economic situation in the 1990s (Kryukov, 2009: 37). Thus, the oil and gas sector represents an important trend in economic development and is viewed by the Russian state as a source of economic stability in the country.

According to the Energy strategy (ES-2030, 2009: 39), the Russian energy complex plays an important role in the economic development of the country, and oil and gas revenues contribute to national economic growth and independence. The structure of natural gas reserves in Russia is more favourable than the structure of oil reserves because of accessibility (ES-2030, 2009: 39). Nevertheless, the number of complex and hard to extract resources has also increased just as in the oil sector (ES-2030, 2009: 39). Thus, the expectations and prognosis of the ES-2030 (2009) relies on a high level of gas extraction and high prices in the world market, which would allow the country to expand the export of gas to new markets and continue internal gasification of the country. The Energy Strategy (ES-2030, 2009) was formulated in 2008 under very favourable conditions for oil and gas prices on the world market (compared to 2000).² However, in 2009, the Russian energy industry was seriously affected by the global financial crisis of 2007 - 2008 and suffered from the decline in price and demand (Mitrova, 2014: 58). Compared to 2008, gas production was 12% lower in 2009 (Mitrova, 2014: 58). The document was created with a hope that the crisis situation on the world market would change soon. Meanwhile Russia would manage to modernize and to regain its strength. Some recovery in the industry was registered by the year 2011. Oil production was 0.8% higher and gas production increased by 2.9% in 2011 compared to 2010 (Godzimirski, 2014: 1). However, this recovery occurred while the price of petroleum started to fall. The Russian energy sector has since had to cope with lower profits, a loss of external investors and shrunken demand for Russian gas (Mitrova, 2014: 59). Despite the changing situation of the market, oil and gas remain a highly valued commodity for the Russian state in terms of economic and national security. That is why the connections between development and security should be better explored. Below I will discuss some theoretical approaches.

Articulating cross points between security and development

Fierke (2007: 150) claims that the concept of human security can be considered a result of the convergence of security and development studies, which reflects their joint concern about the well-being of individuals in a particular context. Though it appeared on the international political scene in the 1990s, the concept of human security is not new, and some scholars note that it is possible to trace the intellectual origin of human security back to the 1940s (MacFarlane & Khong, 2006; Inglehart & Norris, 2012). Indeed, Rothschild (1995) brings us back to the middle of the 17th century and shows the transformation of the concept through various epochs. Rothschild (1995) and Hoogensen (2005) also point out that, in the 17th and 18th centuries, security was viewed as essential for establishing the relationship between the state and the individual, and therefore the two concepts of state and human security were interconnected. The concept of development was developed in the eighteenth century and initially was related to questions of poverty, equality and justice, and, lately, to economic growth (Currie-Alder, 2016). Thus, initially both concepts were related to the state and were oriented towards improving conditions for human well-being.

Harriss (2014: 35) points out that, at least in the English language, the word development has several meanings. Among those are “growth” (including “economic growth”), “change”, and

“progress”. These applications of the word “development” were criticized as the field of development studies became broader and the distribution of wealth among a population within a nation-state and across the globe was discussed in relation to such variables as education, gender, health, and environment. Nonetheless, the main line, as Harriss (2014) argues, lies in discussions between proponents of the state and those who prioritise the roles of the market in the economy. Those discussions brought to light the need for contextualization of economic changes and the role these changes have in improving human well-being. A significant contribution into the field of development studies was done by Amartya Sen who suggested a capability approach. Sen (2003: 5) argued that economic prosperity should be considered as one of the means to enriching people’s lives. The capability approach puts personal freedom and personal experience in the centre of development. At the same time, the capability approach helps evaluate the meaning of commodities or material values differently since commodities “are only of value to us in terms of what they allow us actually to do” (Harriss, 2014: 36). The issue of personal experience and the ability of an individual to be an agent of change is a matter of discussion within security studies as well.

A human security approach claimed that personal experience and the ability to articulate one’s own insecurities are important to understanding security in the contemporary world. In relation to individual experience, the issue of state and non-state actors becomes important. Traditionally, states are considered main security actors, defining the agenda of security in the international arena. But as Hoogensen et al (2009: 2) claim, “[t]here is no particular logic that supports the claim that security can only be the purview of the state, and we must not forget that individuals and communities will always have a significant role to play in the provision of security.” It means that various actors identify insecurities differently, but it is up to the state to recognize those insecurities or to focus only on its own concerns (Hoogensen et al, 2009). Though the capability approach puts personal freedom and personal experience in the centre of development, it is possible to extrapolate its core point on any actor, from individuals to states. The capability approach underscores options and possibilities which the economy provides for a person, group of people, or state. By learning what actors value most and thus what they want to ensure survival of in the future, we can better understand why some statements or actions take place (Hoogensen Gjørsv, 2017: 38). Values create an important connection between development and security since they are an important part of choice making: “The focus here is on the freedom that a person actually has to do this or be that - things that he or she may value doing or being” (Sen, 2009: 231 as cited in Harriss, 2014: 36). Thus, actors make a choice based on their values or visions of what is important for them. Values become a bridge connecting human security and development. But while development is about what we want to change, security is about what we want to preserve.

Hoogensen Gjørsv (2012: 837) argues that while examining security, it is necessary to take into consideration the practice of security (how), the context (where) and values (why). These questions will help to explore the nexus between development (a change) and security (a preservation). I will explore the practice of security and development on two levels: federal and regional. In my analysis, I will focus on the Russian Federation and the Murmansk region as main actors with their own perspectives on security and development (answering the question “who?” and “where?”). Nonetheless, the focus of my analysis is on the question “why”: Why does Russia need transformations? I will approach values as certain landmarks helping to clarify

positions of proponents and to explore meaning attached to the concepts of security and development in the context of oil and gas development in the Russian Arctic. In the next section I will discuss how to reveal values.

Framing approach and the scope of study: methodological note

There are different levels of analysis: statements, policies and actions. In this article, the analysis will be conducted on the level of statements in order to obtain a more nuanced understanding of security and development in Russia. This analysis creates a background for future discussions, for example, of differences between statements and actions.

This study is based on an examination of documents published at the national (federal) and regional levels. The work with official documents provides access to how development and security were thought of from a federal as well as regional perspective and thus to what kind of values are behind these thoughts. The Murmansk region is selected as a case study. The differences between the Arctic regions in Russia are enormous in terms of climatic zones, density of population, economic conditions and social stability. Therefore, it is important to examine how state policy is viewed from the regions and to identify alternative interpretations of development and security. Four documents are identified as key documents in relation to activity in the Arctic at the official website of the government of the Russian Federation (<http://government.ru/docs/>). As the main source of information, I selected the “Strategy of Development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and Ensuring National Security until 2020” from 2014 (further the Strategy of Development or SDAZ-2020). This document defines the main objectives, priorities and mechanisms for implementation of the state policy in the Arctic. The SDAZ appeared as the follow-up to the “Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and for a further perspective” issued in 2008 (further the Basics or BRFA-2020). Additionally, two documents on security are selected for the analysis. The BRFA-2020 is related to the “Strategy of National Security” (further the Security strategy or SNS-2020) of 2009. This document clarifies the terminology used in the Federal Law “On Security” (2010). At the regional level, I analyze the “Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of the Murmansk region until 2025” (2010), henceforth the Murmansk Strategy or SSEMD-2025. This document is fundamental for the regional system of governance and provides main guidelines for the management of development in the region. This document is unique since few Russian regions created their own strategy. In these conditions, when the regions are lacking control over their political and economic situation and have limited possibilities to articulate their perspectives, this document is especially valuable.

I apply framing as an approach to this study. There are diverse theoretical and conceptual approaches to framing in different disciplines and fields of study (for more on it see Reese et al, 2008; Borah, 2011). The theory is actively developed in relation to an analysis of mass-media, though Wilson Rowe (2018: 38) traces origins of framing in the literature on the social construction of space and applies framing to the analysis of Arctic politics in order to discover possible political actions in the region. Frames are related to the process of interpretation and their analyses help to reveal the way issues are defined and presented to a broader public. Following Gamson and Modigliani (1989: 3), I define frames as a “central organizing idea”. A focus on a frame creates an analytical perspective, which allows exploring interpretations of development and security in various documents. Gamson and Modigliani (1989: 3) identify such

tools as metaphors, examples, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images. However, these linguistic marks are hard to find in official documents. Entman (1993: 54) states that the process of framing involves selection and salience as main steps as well as omissions of potential definitions or explanations. I will discuss the federal and regional documents in a separate section. In each section, I will elaborate on the function of the document and its goal. I will discuss framings in terms of word's selection, repetitions and exclusions.

There are some linguistic difficulties related to this analysis. The problem with demarcation between security, military security and state security in the Russian language was discussed earlier in this article. In addition to that, the terms "security" and "safety" are both translated into Russian as "security" and this semantic issue can be a subject of a separate study. Russian border guards, the coastguard and emergency response forces in the Arctic have a complicated structure and are divided between civil and military entities (see Klimenko, 2016). These forces are responsible for "safety". Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, mentions related to "safety" and "emergency response" will be allocated under the rubric "national security".

Framing of development and security in official documents

The Strategy of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013) defines the main objectives, priorities and mechanisms for implementation of the state policy in the Arctic. The document offers mechanism of implementations, suggests variables for evaluation and ways of measurement of social and economic development. Development and security are already linked in the title of the document. The goal of the Strategy of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013, Section II, Item 6) is the implementation of the national interest as well as the achievement of main goals defined in the Basics (BRFA-2020, 2008). Social and economic development is identified through risks and threats in such spheres as social, economic, science and technology, environmental management and environmental protection. The words "risks", "threats" and "strategic" dominate in the document, which in combination with the abundance of terms such as "national security", "national interest" and "national priorities" makes it difficult to separate security and development.

Notions of "national security", "national interest", "threats to national security", and "strategic national priorities" are not explained in the document but they are all introduced in the Security Strategy (SNS-2020, 2009, Section I, item 6). "National security" is defined as "protection of individuals, society and the state from internal and external threats, which allows for the provision of constitutional rights, freedoms, decent quality and standard of life of citizens, sovereignty, territorial integrity and sustainable development of the Russian Federation, the defence and security of the state" (SNS-2020, 2009, Section I, item 6). In this definition there are two important messages. First, "national security" protects the needs of the individual, society and the state. But in general, as I discussed elsewhere (see Goes, 2017), the document strongly emphasizes the role of the state as a security provider and prioritizes traditional state values such as national defence and border protection. Second, security becomes a necessary condition for sustainable development of the country.

The concept of "national interest" is defined as a "set of internal and external needs of the state in ensuring the security and sustainable development of the individual, society and the state." SNS-2020, 2009, Section I, item 6). Thus, security is assigned to the state, whereas sustainable

development concerns “individual, society and the state”. This set is further clarified in the document. National interests are identified as the development of democracy and civil society; improving the competitiveness of the national economy; in ensuring the inviolability of the constitutional order, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian Federation; and in turning the Russian Federation into a world power whose activity is aimed at maintaining strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnerships in a multipolar world (SNS-2020, 2009, Section III, Item 21). National interests in the Arctic are specified in the Basics (BRFA-2020, 2008, Section II, item I): the Arctic as a strategic resource base of the Russian Federation; the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation; preservation of unique ecological systems of the Arctic; and usage of the Northern Sea Route.

The term “strategic national priorities” identifies “the most important areas of national security” (SNS-2020, 2009, Section I, item 6). According to the Security strategy, these are the most important areas of security that affect three spheres: constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens; sustainable socio-economic development; and sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, the concept of development is articulated as a part of the national security concept. But the connection between socio-economic development and security is exposed differently in the Basics. Thus, the goals and priorities of social and economic development are defined as the enlargement of the resource base to provide Russia with oil and gas resources, water resources and other strategic sources (BRFA-2020, 2008, Section III, item 6a). Meanwhile in the security sphere, development should be done in the direction of military, environmental, informational, science and technology, and international cooperation. It means that security and development are not the same and have different spheres and priorities.

Priorities of development are identified in three documents: the Security strategy (SNS-2020, 2009, Section III, item 24), the Basics (BRFA-2020, 2008, Section III, item 7) and the Strategy of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013, Section III, item 7). In the Security strategy (SNS-2020, 2009), priorities are identified in terms of “living standards”, “personal security”, “human capital”, and “balanced consumption”. In the Basics (BRFA-2020, 2008) priorities are identified in terms of “strategic resources”, “national security”, “defence”, “knowledge”, and “technology”. The Strategy of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013) operates by such terms as “economic development”, “social and economic development”, “sustainable development of fuel and energy complex”, “sustainable social and economic development”, “complex development”, “complex social and economic development”, and “sustainable innovative social and economic development”. Nonetheless, their application is very loose and no explanation is given as to what they mean and what the differences are between them. The document claims that implementation of the strategy will provide a “comprehensive build-up of competitive advantages of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation in order to reinforce the position of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, strengthen international security, maintain peace and stability, as well as enhance international cooperation” (SDAZ-2020, 2013, Section V, item 32). Thus, changes are needed for improving Russia’s image in the international arena and the state is the main value. In total, it is possible to conclude that the Strategy of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013) is framed in terms of security with articulated connections to the state, military preparedness and border protection.

Framing of the Murmansk strategy

The Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) is a product of collective work of different experts – scientists, business representatives, public officials, and NGOs. It was published in 2010 and thus it does not refer to the Strategy of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013). Nonetheless, it takes into consideration other federal documents which were in power by that time. The Murmansk strategy identifies ways and mechanisms for working with challenges, which are defined as existing risks and opportunities (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 33). The document operates by such words as “risks”, “opportunities”, and “possibilities”. In several cases, headlines are accompanied by subheadings which clarify the content of chapter. For example, a headline: “7. Mission (goals) and purposes of the authorities and vision of the Murmansk region” is complemented by a subheading “The region, how we see it, want it and can create it” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 40). Another headline states: “8. Main directions of social and economic development of the Murmansk region”. A subheading clarifies: “Our action programme” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 46). This application of pronouns and possessive pronouns demonstrates existence of the collective “we” or actors of development. Those actors are named as the state, society, business, science and regional authorities, and the need for cooperation between them is emphasized (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 40).

Words like “human capital”, “human potential”, “mission”, and “capabilities” are actively used in the text. The word “development” is applied in many occasions, including “sustainable development”, “spatial development”, “human potential development”, “social and economic development”, “urban development”, “complex development”, “social and cultural development”, and “social development”. Clarification of the term “sustainable development” is given in relation to environment: “sustainable, that is not leading to irreparable environmental consequences and not creating threats to the well-being of the next generations” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 40). Principles of sustainable development such as the preservation of the environment, efficient usage of resources, a sustainable settlement system, population preservation and cultural development are thought as main principles of development of the region (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 46). The word “priority” is also used in the Murmansk strategy, but less intensively than in the federal documents. It was used in relation to the state, like “priorities of national interests” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 25) or “priorities, plans and positions of federal authorities” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 40). Mainly it is applied in relation to environmental problems in the region. Once it was used in the document to define regional priorities. The Murmansk strategy prioritises “social stability, development and discovery of human potential (society and economy of capabilities) and modernization of the economy and society on the basis of innovation and knowledge” (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 46). Economic terms like “index”, “trends”, “market”, and “micro-region” are widely applied in the document. The document also refers to the federal document “Concept of long-term social and economic development of the Russian Federation” (2008) which puts among its goals: a high standard of human welfare, social well-being and consensus, economics of leadership and innovations, balance of spatial development, a globally competitive economy, economic freedom and justice, and security of citizens and society (SSEDM-2025, 2010: 30-31). These goals would allow Russian economics to move from raw materials to an innovative, socially oriented type of development.

The word “security” is carefully used in the Murmansk strategy and is not dominating. Mainly the term “environmental security” is applied. In relation to this, it is necessary to point out that the word “environment”, “ecology” and “ecosystem” frequently appear in the document. References are made to the “Strategic action plan on environmental protection of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” (2009) and to the “Climate doctrine of the Russian Federation” (2009). Several times the word “security” is applied in the meaning of “safety”, especially in relation to transport and logistics, and emergency response. Mainly, the reference to state security is done through an articulation of the geographic location of the Murmansk region and its role in border protection. The term public security is also used in the document. The document also refers to the “Food security doctrine of the Russian Federation” (2010).

To sum up, the Murmansk strategy (SSEDM-2025, 2010) is written in the language of economics and environment with a focus on human development and capabilities. Mostly the document maps existing risk and identifies challenges, difficulties, opportunities and perspectives for the region.

Discussion

In the two previous sections, I analysed the framing of “security” and “development” in official documents on the federal and regional levels. The application of three main variables – word selection, salience and silence – helped to demonstrate specifics of the documents as well as differences in framing.

The central organizing idea (or value) of the federal documents is the state and its power and security. There is a difference between the documents written in 2008 (BRFA-2020) and in 2013 (SDAZ-2020). The framing of the document in 2008 does not have strong markers of security language, while the document from 2013 is written in terms of threats and risks, and the main place belongs to national security. Even the Security strategy (SNS-2020) from 2009, which was written with the aim of clarifying security terms and complements the law on security, has a balance between the language of security and development. It puts development for citizens on the agenda along with the state.

The Strategy of development (SDAZ-2020, 2013) does not refer to the “Concept of a long-term social and economic development of the Russian Federation” (2008). The concept was created as a guideline for new documents, plans and indicators generated by the authorities in the field of development. The analysis of the SDAZ-2020 (2013) allows us to conclude that the strategy was written with the aim of framing the Arctic as an essential part of national security and to promote the state as the main security actor and beneficiary of development. The concept of development is presented as a part of the concept of national security. The needs and demands of other actors, which are involved in the process of development, are not articulated. Due to the definition of national security, it is assumed that the state represents individuals and society and thus is capable of recognizing the range of other demands not only in the sphere of security, but development as well.

This framing reveals two difficulties. The first one is related to the role of the state in economy and security. As studies show (see Hoogensen Gjørsv, 2012; Currie-Alder et al., 2014), the state on its own is not capable of meeting the needs of different actors. For example, the Shtokman project was expected to start production in 2012, but due to economic and technical challenges,

it was slowed down in 2012 and put on ice in 2015. Thus, despite all promises given to the Murmansk region in relation to investments and economic growth, the Shtokman project never moved forward from the planning phase. The Shtokman Development AG, the company that was established in order to develop Shtokman, was abolished by Gazprom in July 2019, which put the full stop to the project (Staalesen, 2019). The talks about this giant state-controlled project created various expectations in the region and demonstrated differences in approaches. Some of the regional actors did not trust the promises given by the federal authorities and did not consider petroleum revenues as desirable for regional development (see Goes, 2017). Thus, if for the state Shtokman was a source of economic stability and national security, for some regional actors it was a source of insecurity and instability because it was state controlled.

The second difficulty is methodological in its nature. Framing development in the language of security creates some complications in extracting what is about to be changed and what values are important. The key documents on the Arctic have many connections with other legal acts, which makes it difficult to navigate between security and development. The concept of development expressed in security terms becomes superficial and less articulated because it is difficult to describe social and economic issues in the language of security.

The analysis of the Murmansk strategy (SSDEM-2025, 2010) reveals another framing. The central organizing idea is around the human being and human capabilities. The document frames human beings as actors, who can and want to do something in the region. Human capital is presented as an object and subject of development. SSDEM-2025 (2010) is written in economic and development terms and has a direct reference to the “Concept of a long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation” as well as to the Basics (BRFA-2020, 2008). Even though the term “development” has strong connections to the field of environment, together with the language of economics applied in the document, it creates a nexus between a place where people live and where changes take place. Thus, the issue of responsibility appears on the agenda of the document. A direct reference to “national security” is omitted, nonetheless the document provides a more nuanced picture of security. In particular, the focus on “human capital” and “human resources” places regional interpretations of development closer to Sen’s capability approach. As a result, the document reveals a human security perspective without an application of the term “human security”. People are articulated as a main value and changes are needed in order to make the region attractive for people to live in. This is particularly important in the situation when the Murmansk region has been struggling to attract a young labour force and to keep the specialists already working there. A process of out-migration started in the 1990s and this tendency has remained a factor in the 21st century. The population has steadily declined from 1,164,600 in 1989 to 748,100 in 2019 (Murmanskstat, 2019). Overall, it is possible to conclude that the document reflects a general trend – language of security belongs to the state and can be applied by federal authorities only. Nonetheless, the document provides an insight into how development and its related issues in the Arctic are framed. This analysis shows that development can be discussed in terms other than the language of security and that security approaches cannot be reduced to state security only.

Conclusions

In this article I demonstrated connections between security and development in the context of the Russian Arctic. I discussed connections between these two concepts in the literature and

concluded that values can be viewed as a bridge between these two concepts. With the application of a framing approach, I analysed the federal document “Strategy of development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and security provision until 2020” (SDAZ-2025, 2013) and the regional “Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of the Murmansk region until 2025” (SSEMD-2025, 2010). The analysis revealed that the connection between development and security exists and is even manifested in the name of the federal document. Nonetheless, this connection has some specific characteristics. The regional document is avoiding usage of security language, meanwhile the federal document is using security language to frame development in the Arctic.

Analysis of the connection between development and security in the Russian Arctic helps to reveal what is valued on the regional and federal level and to demonstrate the variety of visions. On the federal level, the answer to the question “why do we need development” and “what do we want to protect” is the state. At the same time, on the regional level, the answer is human resources. The Murmansk strategy makes people the main actors and beneficiaries of development, meanwhile acknowledging the state as the main security actor.

Overall, it is possible to conclude that there are different approaches to development and security in the Russian Arctic. Analysis of the documents issued on various levels gives a better understanding of what is going on in Russia. Regional approaches might differ from the one articulated on the federal level. Thus, human security may not be articulated on the national agenda, but plays an important role at the regional level.

Notes

1. The “Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation” (CNS 1997, Section 4) defined the Arctic as a crisis region in need for special state support. Meanwhile the “Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and for a further perspective” (BRFA-2020, 2008, Section II, item 4a) defines the Russian Arctic as a “strategic resource base” which provides the means for the socio-economic development of the country.
2. In 2008 one barrel cost 94 dollars. In 2000, it was 27 dollars per barrel (ES-2030, 2009: 3).

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